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Abstract. I summarize the recent work on market (in)efficiency, highlighting key
elements why financial markets will never be made efficient. My approach is not by
adding more empirical evidence, but giving plausible reasons as to where inefficiency
arises and why it’s not rational to arbitrage it away.
1 The Debate
The debate of whether a competitive market is efficient has been a hot topic in
the last few decades. Academics, practitioners and general public are divided
roughly into two camps: believers and non-believers of the so-called Efficient
Market Hypothesis (EMH). Both camps have piled up mountains of evidence,
yet no consensus can be said to have ever reached.
Efficient markets are a natural consequence of neoclassical economics,
little wonder most believers of EMH come from mainstream economics de-
partments. Paul Samuelson, the most influential living economist, claimed to
have ‘mathemathically proven’ that competitive markets are efficient. Cham-
pioning this camp now is the Chicago finance professor Eugene Fama. Non-
believers, on the other hand, most are practitioners in the finance industry,
and they make a living out of feeding on the residual inefficiency left in the
market. Their very existence, they’d say, is proof enough of the contrary of
EMH. One may get some idea from the recent book Alchemy of Finance of
George Soros. Academic economics is not a tight block, forceful opposition to
EMH can be found in the writings of well-known economists such like Colin
Camerer, Robert Shiller and especially Richard Thaler. Their approach is
labelled sometimes as ‘behavorial economics’.
One has to look for roots in the neoclassical economics. Its founding doc-
trine is that economics is about optimally allocating scarce resources among
competing uses. According to it market inefficiency, if any, would be arbi-
traged away by competitive players whose greed assures that markets stay
at least closely to the perfect efficiency. It is later conceded that small ineffi-
ciency can be still made consistent with EMH, since market players have to
compensate their information seeking and transaction costs. Representative
work can be found in the recent book by Andrew Lo and Craig Mackinlay
A Non-Random Walk Down Wall Street. Another concession from the main-
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steam economics is that ‘smart money’ enjoys some extra gains since there
are ‘noise traders’ foolish enough to sustain the fat cats on Wall Street.
2 Marginally Inefficient Markets (MEM) Theory
Recently I introduced an approach taking a different perspective[1]. The so-
called MEM theory maintains that financial markets are open systems, with
unlimited potential entrants. Financial markets sport two main categories of
players: producers and speculators .
Producers are the players who pay less attention than speculators to
exploiting market inefficiency, their economic activities outside the finan-
cial markets provide them better opportunities for profit than exploiting the
market inefficiency. Yet their normal business conduct depends on heavily
using the financial markets and their participation inadvertently injets the
the elememts of predictability into the markets. They do this not because of
generosality but of inevitability. And they care less since their core business
is the outside economy.
Speculators are the players whose speciality is in ‘scavenging’ financial
markets for the tiny predictability (hence inefficiency) left by others. They
do this purely for their own greed and inadvertently they render a social
service: they provide liquidity so that the producers can use the market in
a large scale under a relatively efficient conditions (compared to still larger
opportunities in outside economy). Why don’t our speculators arbitrage away
the residual inefficiency in the financial markets? The key lies in that the
predictability elements in the financial markets are of probabilistic nature,
no one can take out of the money without making huge bets and taking on
substanstial risks. In a previous work I show that to completely arbitrage
away the probabilistic predictability one needs infinite amount of risk capital.
When the residual inefficiency is reduced to be small enough, the gain to risk
ratio doesn’t warrant further playing the arbitrage game. The possibility of
arbitraging away inefficiency completely exists only in theoretical fiction.
Symbiosis can be said of the relationship between producers and spec-
ulators. In the pursuit of their strictly selfish gains, due to their separate
specialities (producers in outside economy and speculators in refining arbi-
trage), they unwillingly support each other’s existence. A producer would,
indeed sometimes does, avoid being taken advantage of by the speculators,
by taking measures mimicking that of speculators. For instance it may avoid
let traders to know its intentions of the forthcoming financial operations.
But their ability of doing so is limited, not because competence, but rational
thinking would let it concentrate on doing whatever it’s good at and pay
less attention to the relatively small market inefficiency. A speculator on the
other hand, would like to make away money as much as possible, but without
risking substantial amount of money this is impossible. It has to be content
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with managing its risk while possibly make more money. There is a absolute
limit in his ability in doing so.
Due to the impossibility of completely arbitraging away the inefficiency
the two parties live in a unwilling symbiosis bind. It’s not necessarily a peace-
ful coexistence. For given the chance a speculator would like to scoop others’
private information to grab a a big gain with little risk. But such easy gains
are rare in competitive markets, especially when there is a credible institu-
tion enforcing fair-play rules. So they have to do the hard work of analyzing
the tinest details of available information and most importantly, comprehend
the implications of myriads of confusing leads. There is a minimum service
(liquidity) that a speculator must provide in order to extract a given amount
of profit. Thus a properly designed institution can channel the greedy spec-
ulators to do some social service by providing liqudity, while doing well.
On the other hand given the chance a producer would like to reduce their
‘loss’ to the other players in the markets. But competence for it is different,
and outside economic activities demand financial market participation at a
rythm in general not synchrontized with that of financial markets. A pro-
ducer must pay more heed to the intrinsic production rythm, rather than
to the market fluctuations. So the producers’ outside activities provide the
market predictability in the first place, the speculators scavenging on these
opportunities help provide liquidity.
It’s possible that some of the speculators believe they are making money
and in reality they actually lose. They can be said to be ‘noise traders’. In
the market ecology it’s likely that all types of players are intertwined. But I
believe the fundamental element must lie in the symbiosis of the producers
and speculators.
3 Minority Game as a Test
It’s hard to test the above theory directly, as we cannot halt the normal fi-
nancial operations to see who played what role. However, powerful analytic
tools are available to test the theory. A recently developed model called Mi-
nority Game can be made convenient for our purpose[2]. Minority Game is a
platform which is flexible enough to model quite a large class of multi-agents
problem. In MG model players have a finite number of alternative strategies,
the simplest case being two alternatives. Players have the choice of using the
alternatives according to the market fluctuations. In most cases, more alter-
natives, more average gain. If a player for some reason has less alternatives
than the others, one can show that in general this handicap leads to relative
loss.
From the standard MG model we can divide the players into two classes:
producers and speculators. To model the real producers we impose on our
MG producers the handicap of only a single strategy, i.e. no other alterna-
tives and their operation in the MG market is like an automaton. Our MG
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speculators are normal MG players with two alternative strategies. They have
the capability, as in the standard MG model, to adjust their use of alterna-
tive strategies according market fluctuations. With the handicap, it’s is an
extreme case to model the producers’ inflexibility facing market fluctuations.
As discussed above, producers get profit from the outside economic activities
and they don’t mind their possible relatively small loss due to market fluctu-
ations. Left with only one strategy it is not hard for the speculators to detect
that the market price has some regularity in it. But it’s still highly non-trivial
price signal since each producer’s fixed strategy is randomly drawn, and in
principle they are all different from each other. Moreover, the population is
mixed with speculators and producers.
Players with no alternative or less alternatives tend to be rigid or less
agile than others. A price signal containing some regular elements implies to
have some predictability in it. Any predictability in the price history is by
definition market inefficiency. From information theoretic point of view we
say that the conditional entropy of the price signal is not maximized. Or,
there is some negative entropy left in the price signal that a savvy speculator
can detect and act on it. The following calculation is provided by Damien
Challet, now a postdoc in Oxford.
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Fig. 1. The vertical axis is the negative entropy, any value above zero implying
some degree of predictability, its special value 1 corresponds to certainty, which is
normally considered in economics literature. The original system consists of 200
pure speculators, on the horizontal axis we see with the gradual introduction of
producers, the negative entropy increases. With their total number capped at 200,
additional speculators are introduced, they scavenge away the negative entropy.
Solid lines are analytical calculations, the dots are results from directly simulating
the model.
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We consider a population initially only with pure speculators, they over-
work for nothing since there is no negative entropy left in the system. In
reality speculators would stop playing but in our model they are forced to
play on. Now producers are gradually introduced and the price signal gradu-
ally appears to be more and more interesting, in the figure we see the negative
entropy rises signalling that the price becomes more and more predictable.
We reach the number of producers at 200 and keep them in the system. Now
we want to introduce extra speculators into the system to take advantage of
the information-rich price fluatuations. As we can see the predictability of
the price, or the negative entropy starts to get reduced, until the point when
the market is made again efficient, i.e. null negative entropy. In our system
the players are slaves and are forced to play as we pleased. In reality this
mustn’t be so since profit driven speculators would stop playing when the
profitability becomes meager. Needless to say MG is but a toy model, and
the market impact is such that speculators can eliminate any inefficiency if
their number is large enough. Contrary to real markets where infinite risk
capital is needed.
4 Conclusion
It appears that previously studies on the market efficiency problem are con-
centrated on the markets themselves, insulated from the outside. Our novol
approach emphasize that it’s impossible to understand the problem in isola-
tion. We need to cast the market mechanism into a bigger framework. In other
words we are dealing an open system: there is always fresh injection of pre-
dictable elememts from a fraction of players, who put in the ‘inefficiency’ in
the first place. This way of reasoning goes against the dominating neoclassical
doctrine that systems can be reduced into mechanic pieces and understood
separately. Technical tools that we have developped in recent years are quite
advanced in dealing with systems of multi-agent and active work is still be-
ing performed. If markets are only marginally efficient, would we have a less
elegant theory in place of EMH? Not a bit. It appears that the MEM theory
outlined above is just part of a much large theoretical framework, which will
be discussed in full in a forthcoming book[3]. Acknowledgements: I benefit-
ted from collaboration with Andrea Capocci, Damien Challet and Matteo
Marsili.
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